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Abstract
On modern operating systems, applications under the same user are separated
from each other, for the purpose of protecting them against malware and com-
promised programs. Given the complexity of today’s OSes, less clear is whether
such isolation is effective against different kind of cross-app resource access at-
tacks (called XARA in our research). To better understand the problem, on
the less-studied Apple platforms, we conducted a systematic security analysis
on MAC OS X and iOS. Our research leads to the discovery of a series of high-
impact security weaknesses, which enable a sandboxed malicious app, approved
by the Apple Stores, to gain unauthorized access to other apps’ sensitive data.
More specifically, we found that the inter-app interaction services, including
the keychain, WebSocket and NSConnection on OS X and URL Scheme on OS
X and iOS, can all be exploited by the malware to steal such confidential in-
formation as the passwords for iCloud, email and bank, and the secret token
of Evernote. Further, the design of the App sandbox on OS X was found to
be vulnerable, exposing an app’s private directory to the sandboxed malware
that hijacks its Apple Bundle ID. As a result, sensitive user data, like the notes
and user contacts under Evernote and photos under WeChat, have all been dis-
closed. Fundamentally, these problems are caused by the lack of app-to-app and
app-to-OS authentications. To better understand their impacts, we developed
a scanner that automatically analyzes the binaries of OS X and iOS apps to
determine whether proper protection is missing in their code. Running it on
hundreds of binaries, we confirmed the pervasiveness of the weaknesses among
high-impact Apple apps. Since the issues may not be easily fixed, we built a
simple program that detects exploit attempts on OS X, helping protect vulner-
able apps before the problems can be fully addressed. We further discuss the
insights from this study and the lessons learnt for building a securer system.
1 Introduction
The pervasiveness of computing technologies and emerging security threats they
are facing have profoundly changed the security designs of modern operating sys-
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tems (OS). Moving away from the traditional threat model in which all applica-
tions (app for short) under the same user trust each other with their information
assets, today’s OSes tend to separate those apps and their resources, in an at-
tempt to prevent a malicious or compromised program from causing damage to
others. This has been achieved through a variety of app isolation mechanisms:
each app is confined in its partition with a minimum set of privileges, called
sandbox, and needs to explicitly require additional capabilities (e.g., access to
camera, audio, etc.) from the OS or the user. Such a security model has been
adopted by most mainstream systems, including Windows, MAC OS X, An-
droid, iOS, etc. With its popularity, the effectiveness of the technique, however,
has still not been fully understood, due to the complexity of a modern OS, which
makes comprehensive protection challenging.
Unauthorized cross-app resource access. Recent studies show that sand-
boxed Android apps can still get access to other apps’ resources and acquire sys-
tem capabilities without proper authorization [28]. For example, the developer
could accidentally make public an app’s interface for interprocess communica-
tion (IPC), through which its internal service or activity can be triggered by a
message (called Intent) from an unauthorized app to acquire sensitive data [25]
or elevated privileges (e.g., access to audio, GPS, etc.) [18, 24, 20]. Funda-
mentally, the problem is caused by the migration of the threat model and the
transitional pain that it comes with: both the OS designer and the app devel-
oper are less used to the mindset that all apps, even when they all belong to
the same user, should treat each other as untrusted, and proper security checks
should always be performed in all aspects of app-to-app and app-to-system in-
teractions.
In those attacks, malicious code under some isolation constraints manages
to gain access to other apps’ resources or affect the way they are used by legit-
imate apps, when it is not authorized to do so. We call such a security threat
unauthorized cross-app resource access or XARA. Although specific instances
of XARA are found on the Android platform, less known is whether it is indeed
a generic issue. Particularly, we do not know whether app isolation works effec-
tively on MAC OS X and iOS, which are widely considered to be securer than
Android. These operating systems offer unique mechanisms to confine apps and
support cross-app interactions, very different from those provided by Android.
Specifically, the construction of Apple sandboxes is significantly different from
that of Android, in which each app is given a unique User ID (UID), allowing
the Linux user protection to separate the apps. In contrast, an Apple app is
identified by its Apple ID, which contains a Bundle ID (BID) token used by the
OS to enforce sandbox policies. The uniqueness of the token is ensured by the
Apple Store. Also, OS X supports complicated cross-app resource sharing. For
example, its keychain service allows multiple apps to share credentials among
them through an access-control list (Section 3.1), which is not supported on
other systems like Android. In addition to cross-app resource sharing, other
cross-app interactions, i.e., IPC on Apple platforms, also differ from those on
Android. Examples include NSConnection that shares objects between apps
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on OS X and the URL Scheme uniquely associated with one single app, for
launching it with an URL1. So far, little has been done to understand whether
the construction of app isolation on Apple platforms is secure and whether its
cross-app mechanisms can bring in XARA risks never known before.
Our work. We conducted the first study on the XARA risks of Apple’s iso-
lation mechanisms, and discovered surprising security-critical vulnerabilities:
major cross-app resource-sharing mechanisms (such as keychain) and commu-
nication channels (including WebSocket, NSConnection and Scheme) turn out
to be insufficiently protected by both the OS and the apps using them, allow-
ing a malicious program to steal from these apps sensitive user data; also the
BID-based sandbox construction is found to be less reliable than expected, and
its resource-sharing mechanism can be exploited by the malicious app to break
the sandbox confinement on OS X, gaining full access to other apps’ directories
(called container). Note that not only does our attack code circumvent the OS-
level protection but it can also get through the restrictive app vetting process
of the Apple Stores, completely defeating its multi-layer defense.
Looking into the root cause of those security flaws, we found that in the most
cases, neither the OS nor the vulnerable app properly authenticates the party
it interacts with. To understand the scope and magnitude of this new XARA
threat, we developed an analyzer for automatically inspecting Apple apps’ bina-
ries to determine their susceptibility to the XARA threat, that is, whether they
perform security checks when using vulnerable resource-sharing mechanisms and
IPC channels, a necessary step that has never been made clear by Apple. In
our study, we ran the analyzer on 1,612 most popular MAC apps and 200 iOS
apps, and found that more than 88.6% of the apps using those mechanisms and
channels are completely exposed to the XARA attacks (Section 4.2), and every
app’s container directory has been fully disclosed. The consequences are dire:
for example, on the latest Mac OS X 10.10.3, our sandboxed app successfully
retrieved from the system’s keychain the passwords and secret tokens of iCloud,
email and all kinds of social networks stored there by the system app Internet
Accounts, and bank and Gmail passwords from Google Chrome; from various
IPC channels, we intercepted user passwords maintained by the popular 1Pass-
word app (ranked 3rd by the MAC App Store) and the secret token of Evernote
(ranked 3rd in the free “Productivity” apps); also, through exploiting the BID
vulnerability, our app collected all the private notes under Evernote and all the
photos under WeChat. We reported our findings to Apple and other software
vendors, who all acknowledged their importance. . We also built an app that
captures the attempts to exploit the weaknesses.
Our study also shows that this XARA hazard is indeed general, across dif-
ferent platforms. Even though iOS drops many useful functionalities of OS X
(e.g., keychain’s access control list for sharing passwords or tokens across apps)
and therefore less vulnerable, it is still not immune to the threat. Particu-
larly, its major IPC channel, Scheme, is equally subject to the hijacking attack
1On Android, an Intent-based Scheme is different as it can be connected to multiple
apps, which the user can choose once the scheme is triggered.
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we discovered on MAC OS X (Section 3.4). Further, the WebSocket problem
(Section 3.3) actually comes from HTML5, which happens when a browser ex-
tension is connecting to a local program. We found that the same attack can
also succeed on iOS and Windows. Interestingly, compared with OS X and
iOS, Android looks pretty decent in terms of its protection against the XARA
threat: at the very least, it offers a mechanism to protect its Intent-based IPC,
through assigning a private attribute to the service and activity or guarding
them with permissions, which are missing on the Apple platforms. We further
discuss the lessons learnt from our study, particularly the need for clarifying the
responsibilities for protecting a cross-app mechanism between the OS provider
and the app developer, and present key principles for avoiding XARA pitfalls
when building new systems (Section 5).
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are outlined as follows:
• New understanding of the XARA threat. We are the first to identify the
generality of the XARA problem and systematically investigate the threat on
the Apple platforms. Our study brings to light a series of unexpected, security-
critical flaws that can be exploited to circumvent Apple’s isolation protection
and its App Store’s security vetting. The consequences of such attacks are
devastating, leading to complete disclosure of the most sensitive user information
(e.g., passwords) to a malicious app even when it is sandboxed. Such findings,
which we believe are just a tip of the iceberg, will certainly inspire the follow-
up research on other XARA hazards across platforms. Most importantly, the
new understanding about the fundamental cause of the problem (Section 5) is
invaluable to the development of better app-isolation protection for future OSes.
• New effort to mitigate the threat. We developed new techniques for identifying
the apps vulnerable to the XARA threat, and the attempts to exploit them
during an operating system’s runtime.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
the background information for our research and the assumptions we made;
Section 3 elaborates the security analysis we performed on OS X and iOS,
and the security problems we discovered; Section 4 describes the design and
implementation of the automatic analyzer, the findings made by running the tool
on popular apps and the app-level mitigation we developed; Section 5 highlights
the lessons learnt from our study; Section 6 reviews the related prior research
and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Background
In this section, we describe how app isolation techniques work on popular sys-
tems like Android, MAC OS X and iOS, the way they handle inter-app com-
munication and security risks that come with such a strategy. Also, we present
the adversary model underlying our study.
App sandboxing. App sandboxing plays a critical role in the Android secu-
rity architecture. Each Android app is given a unique UID and runs as the
user. Sensitive resources are assigned to Linux groups such as GPS, Audio, etc.
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This treatment automatically isolates one app from others under the Linux user
and process protection. To access system resources, an app needs to request
permissions from the OS or the user. A permission can also be defined by the
app for sharing its resources with authorized parties (those with the permission)
through the interfaces like content providers, Intent receiver, etc.
The Apple sandbox first appears on MAC OS X, which utilizes the Trust-
edBSD mandatory access control framework to enforce its security policies at the
system-call level. Since OS X 10.7.5 Lion, all apps submitted to the MAC App
Store are required to be sandboxed, with some exceptions given to those that
need to run as native code. On the OS side, a service called Gatekeeper blocks
the apps not signed by either the Apple Store or a trusted developer from being
installed2. This ensures that with proper security configurations, most apps
running on a MAC device are under the sandbox confinement. In the mean-
time, OS X maintains its compatibility with the traditional OS security design,
hosting trusted native programs that run with the user’s privileges. On iOS,
however, apps are much simpler (e.g., without intensive document operations)
and can therefore all be sandboxed.
Unlike Android, which isolates an app solely based upon its UID, the Apple
platforms just utilize UIDs to classify apps into groups. For example, on OS X
all the apps from the MAC app store operate under the UID of the current OS
user, and those on iOS under the user mobile. On these platforms, separation
is actually enforced through the TrustBSD’s API interpositions. Each app is
identified by its Apple ID, a two-part string that consists of a Team ID Apple
assigns to the app developer, and a Bundle ID supplied by the developer: for
example, A1B2C3D4E5.com.apple.mail where the first part is the Team ID and
the rest components form the BID. Any app submitted to the Apple Stores goes
through a verification process that among other things, ensures the uniqueness
of the app’s BID. On OS X, this identity also serves as the name of the app’s
container directory. Every sandboxed app on the Apple platforms is given a
container when it is first launched. The directory is used to hold the app’s
internal data and cannot be accessed by other sandboxed apps from different
developers.
An app within the sandbox has only limited privileges. By default, it can
only read and write files within its container and some public directories. This
policy is enforced by checking the developer’s signature on the app against an
access-control list (ACL) associated with each directory (see Section 3.2). Also,
it is not allowed to access network sockets, built-in camera, microphone, printer
and other resources. Whenever use of such resources becomes necessary, the app
explicitly requires them by declaring a set of entitlements within its property file
(called plist file, very much like the Android manifest file). Each entitlement is a
key-value pair that identifies a specific capability (e.g., access to camera). They
are reviewed by the Apple Stores to determine whether the capabilities should
be granted. For some capabilities, such as access to GPS locations, camera, etc.,
the OS further asks for the user’s permission during the app’s runtime.
2This setting can be turned off.
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IPC on the Apple platforms. Among the small set of operations that a
sandboxed app is allowed to do by default is the capabilities to perform some
types of interprocess communication. OS X supports a variety of IPC channels,
including traditional UNIX ones (e.g., pipe, UNIX domain socket, shared mem-
ory) and Apple-specific mechanisms like distributed objects, NSConnection in
particular, and URL schemes. More specifically, a sandboxed app, without any
additional permission, can create an NSConnection server object, vend it and
register with the OS the name of the object. This allows another app (i.e., an
NSConnection client) to communicate with the server after obtaining from the
OS a proxy for the server object using its name. Specifically, through the proxy,
the NSConnection client gets the vended object from the server. The NSCon-
nection mechanism allows the client to invoke methods of the vended object and
access its variables as if the object existed in the client process. To this end,
the client app needs to declare an entitlement com.apple.security.temporary-
exception.mach-lookup.gl
obal-name in its plist.
Socket-based IPC is also available on OS X. To use it, sandboxed apps need
to claim the network capability in their plists. Another unique IPC mechanism
for both OS X and iOS is Scheme: an app can invoke another specific app to
work on a task with a URL click if the latter registers with the OS the scheme
part of the URL. For example, the URL yelp://search?terms=Coffee, once
triggered, let one app launch the Yelp app to search for “Coffee” nearby. Here,
the “yelp://” part is a scheme. Although this mechanism is also used on
Android, which has been implemented using Intent, it is different from that for
OS X and iOS since Apple’s OSes only allow one single app to be associated
with a scheme on a device, while on Android, the user is asked to choose a
scheme’s owner when there are more than one. This major difference enables
our scheme hijacking attack (Section 3.4) which, however, does not pose a
threat on Android. To register a scheme, an Apple app needs to register it
with the OS. This is done on OS X and iOS by simply declaring the scheme in
the app’s plist file. Such a channel can be used by any sandboxed app without
specifying any entitlement.
Adversary model. In our research, we studied what an isolated app can still
do to collect sensitive data and utilize critical sources that belong to other apps,
when it is not entitled to do so. For this purpose, we assume that malicious
apps are submitted to the Apple Stores, which puts them to the test of Apple’s
restrictive review process. In the case that they get published, the apps are
supposed to be installed by the user who also runs security-critical apps on her
device (laptop or smartphone). This is realistic, since apps downloaded from
the Apple Stores are widely considered to be trusted, and particularly, almost
all of them are confined within the sandboxes. For the malware installed in this
way, we assume that they are isolated and only granted a small, inconspicuous
set of capabilities: in addition to what are offered by the OSes by default, they
may need the networking permission (only for the attack in Section 3.3) or that
for the IPC client (for the NSConnection attack). Note that these entitlements
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are among the most innocent ones.
3 XARA Menaces
In our research, we conducted a systematic study on the XARA threat over
the Apple platforms, MAC OS X in particular. Our focus is on how inter-app
interaction channels and services are protected under the sandboxing model,
and how isolation has been enforced on untrusted apps. Following we elaborate
our findings, including the security-critical flaws we discovered in the OS X key-
chain, BID-based separation as well as various IPC channels, i.e., NSConnection,
WebSocket and Scheme on both MAC OS X and iOS. Note that all our attack
apps were uploaded to the Apple App Stores and passed their inspections3.
3.1 Password Stealing
On the Apple platforms, a sandboxed app by default is still allowed to ac-
cess some security-critical services. A prominent example is Apple’s keychain.
Keychain is Apple’s credential management service, through which an app can
store the user’s passwords, secret keys and certificates there. These credentials
will then be automatically used by authorized apps after the user “unlocks”
the keychain through entering her password, in a way similar to the transpar-
ent single-sign-on authentication (though more powerful) from the user’s point
of view. When the keychain is locked, all the credentials there are encrypted
and no one can access their content. The keychain service running on OS X
is powerful, supporting multiple keychains, explicit and implicit unlocking and
complicated access control. Particularly, a default keychain is created for each
user account and serves most system services and many popular apps. It is
automatically unlocked whenever the user logs in, if its password is identical to
that for login.
Although keychain is not part of the Apple sandbox, it can be viewed as
a secure storage system that provides a strong isolation between apps. Even
when it is unlocked, each app cannot touch another’s keychain item unless this
is permitted by the item’s creator, as specified by its ACL. For a sandboxed
app, other apps’ items are very much like being inside their individual container
directories, which it is not allowed to access. However, we show how a subtle
design weakness enables the malicious code to bypass the isolation and steal
user credentials from other apps.
Security weakness. The simplified keychain structure is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. Each keychain item carries the credential (e.g., password, secret key,
etc.) under protection and a set of attributes, such as account name, service
name, path, etc. Types of attributes an item has depend on its class, typically
Internet passwords or generic passwords. Figure 2 further shows how the key-
chain should be used according to Apple [13]. An app first searches the keychain
3To avoid causing damages to Apple users, after the apps were confirmed to be
approved, we immediately removed them from the Apple Store.
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using a set of attributes to find out whether its item has already been there4.
If so, the item should be updated to keep the app’s current credential, after
the app has been authenticated (signature verification) and authorized (ACL
lookup) by the OS. Otherwise, the app creates a new item and set attributes to
index it.
item1 Attributes, Credential, ACL
item3
…
item2 Attributes, Credential, ACL
Attributes, Credential, ACL
Keychain 
Database
 Attributes (account name, service name, path, …)
ACL (trusted app 1, trusted app 2, …)
Figure 1: Simplified Keychain Structure
On OS X, the creator of a keychain item can also attach to it an access
control list. The ACL includes the operations that can be performed on the
item (e.g., read, write, etc.) and a set of trusted apps with the permissions to
do so. Whenever an app attempts to access an item, the service first checks
whether the access is allowed to happen and denies it when it is not. Then,
the service further looks up the ACL: when the app is not there, the user’s
permission is required to let the operation proceed.
status	  =	  FindGenericPassword(args1);	  
If(status	  ==	  found)	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Authen<cateUser(args2);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  …	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  UpdatePasssword(args3);	  
}	  else	  {	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  AddGenericPassword(args4);	  
}	  
Figure 2: Workflow of Keychain Template Code by Apple
With its careful design, this access-control mechanism was found in our
research to still contain security-critical vulnerabilities, allowing a malicious
app to hijack a target app’s keychain item. One scenario for this exploit is that
when the malware runs before the victim app creates a password (or rather a
keychain item) in the keychain. What the attacker can do here is to use the
attributes of the target app (the victim) to claim an item and also craft an ACL
that includes the target as a trusted app. When the target uses the keychain
to store password, it discovers the item with its attributes already there and
treats the item as its own secure storage (illustrated by the Apple’s template
code in Figure 2). Note that this is reasonable given that an app’s older version
or other apps from the same developer may have already been installed on the
system. Since the target is on the ACL of the item (which is controlled by the
attacker), the OS allows all its operations to proceed. Therefore, at no point
4This happens, for example, when the app has been upgraded from a lower version
already in the system.
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the target gets any indications from the keychain that it is just a guest user of
the item, and the owner is untrusted. This confusion will cause the target to
divulge its secrets to the attacker, whenever it updates the user’s credentials to
the keychain.
Apparently, the attack can only succeed when the attributes of the victim’s
keychain item are predictable. This is mostly the case and the attributes typ-
ically remain constant for specific apps or services. Also, the attacker needs
to create the keychain item first. These restrictions, however, turn out to be
unnecessary: we found that the attributes of any keychain item are actually
public, though their content (credential) is protected. And most importantly,
we found a second flaw in keychain that an existing keychain item can be deleted
by an unauthorized sandboxed app. As a result, all the attacker needs to do is
just identifying an existing item, removing it from the keychain and creating a
new one of its own with the same attributes to wait for the target app to put its
secret there. Fundamentally, the problem comes from the challenge for an app
to authenticate the owner of an existing keychain item. Apple does not offer a
convenient way to do so. Little information is given to an app even for identify-
ing the owner of an item, not to mention any authentication support. The only
way that could mitigate the threat is for the target app to inspect an existing
item’s ACL, making sure that its name is not on the list together with untrusted
parties. However, Apple has never mentioned that this should be done. As a re-
sult, protection is not in place within apps, leaving them completely vulnerable
to our attacks.
A straightforward solution is to strip some functionalities from the keychain,
making it simple. Actually, iOS does not have this issue, because its keychain
does not support the ACL at all: every app is only allowed to access its own
item and there is no flexibility to let a group of apps share secrets except those
by same developers. This works because iOS apps are pretty simple and do not
need much collaboration, which is not the case on OS X. For example, Safari
manages the user’s passwords for different websites stored by other browsers
such as Chrome, which is made possible through the keychain’s access con-
trol mechanism. Also, given the trend that the iOS apps become increasingly
complicated, the demand for such collaboration may show up in the future.
Attacks. In our study, we utilized an automatic tool to identify hundreds of
vulnerable apps (Section 4). Here we elaborate our end-to-end attacks on two
prominent examples, Apple’s Internet Accounts and Google Chrome. Internet
Accounts is an OS X system app that manages the user’s various Internet ac-
counts, e.g., those for iCloud, Email, Twitter, Facebook and others. The app
stores those accounts’ secret tokens in the default keychain, each in a different
item. In a similar way, Chrome also keeps the user’s passwords for each web
account.
In our research, we built a sandboxed attack app against Apple’s Internet
Accounts on OS X 10.10, the most recent version when we found the problem,
and Chrome v40.0.2214.94. The attack app managed to hijack the keychain
item the Internet Accounts app uses for keeping the iCloud token and the item
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in which Chrome stores the user’s Facebook password. Note that all other in-
formation these apps put there is equally vulnerable to the same attack. Specif-
ically, iCloud utilizes the user’s email address as her account name and sets the
serviceName attribute to “Apple ID Authentication”. Other attributes the In-
ternet Accounts needs to create and retrieve a keychain item are just the string
length of these two attributes (accoutName and serviceName). Our attack app,
running before the service was set up, first created an item using these attributes
and deliberately granted the full access permission to the Internet Accounts. As
a result, the Apple service unwittingly updated to the item the user’s iCloud
token. In a similar way, the tokens of Gmail, Facebook, Twitter, etc. managed
by Internet Accounts are also exposed to the attack app.
When it comes to Chrome, the browser also utilizes attributes serviceName
(www.facebook.com), accoutName (email address of the user) and their lengths.
Other attributes involved are the URL path (a constant ‘/’), port (always ‘0’),
protocol (kSecPro
tocolTypeHTTPS) and authentication type (kSecAuthentic
ationTypeHTMLForm). Our app successfully hijacked the keychain item and
obtained the user’s Facebook password. It further got through the MAC App
Store’s security checks. Video demos for both attacks are posted online [15].
We reported this vulnerability to Apple on Oct. 15, 2014, and communicated
with them again in November, 2014 and early 2015. They informed us that given
the nature of the problem, they need 6 months to fix it. We checked the most
recent OS X 10.10.3 and beta version 10.10.4 and found that they attempted
to address the iCloud issue using a 9-digit random number as accountName.
However, the accountName attribute for other services, e.g. Gmail, are still the
user’s email address. Most importantly, such protection, based upon a secret
attribute name, does not work when the attacker reads the attribute names
of an existing item and then deletes it to create a clone under its control, a
new problem we discovered after the first keychain vulnerability report and are
helping Apple fix it.
3.2 Container Cracking
The security weaknesses within the keychain happen when sandboxed apps want
to share resources (i.e., passwords) across sandbox boundary. However, even for
the private resources inside each app’s sandbox which are never designed for
sharing, XARA attacks can still happen, due to a weakness in the unique BID-
based separation design on OS X.
BID conflict. As introduced in Section 2, each sandboxed app has a BID, which
needs to be unique. This is important because once the app is installed, its BID
is used to create a container directory that other sandboxed apps cannot touch.
On OS X, all apps’ containers are under the directory ∼/Library/Containers/,
e.g., ∼/Library/Containers/com.evernote.Evernote/.
Their directory names, the BIDs, bind them to their individual apps: the OS
verifies app signatures whenever access attempts are made, and only those from
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the owners of the directories or the parties on their ACLs are allowed to go
through. To ensure the uniqueness of BIDs, the MAC App Store checks sub-
missions to deny those using the BIDs of the apps already in the store5.
What causes a complication here is the embedded programs within an app,
that is, the sub-targets of the app’s project. A sub-target can be a helper
program, XPC Service (another MAC IPC mechanism), or framework, etc. each
of which has its own plist and BID. Particularly, the helper (e.g. 1Password mini
program) and the XPC Service also have their individual container directories,
while the framework is a directory for shared resources (e.g., libraries). For apps
published by the Apple Stores, their helpers and XPC Services are all sandboxed.
Once installed, their containers are also placed under ∼/Library/Containers/,
alongside with those of their main programs. Interestingly, we found in our
research that the MAC Store fails to verify whether a sub-target’s BID is in
conflict with those belonging to other apps or their sub-targets, except for the
Apple reserved BID (those starting with com.apple). This allows one to publish
an attack app whose helpers or XPC Services are using the BIDs of other apps,
their helpers or XPC Services. Once the attack app is launched, whenever
the OS finds out that the container directory bearing the sub-target’s BID
(as its name) already exists, the sub-target is automatically added onto the
directory’s ACL. As a result, the malicious app gains the full access to other
apps’ containers, which completely breaks its sandbox confinement.
The cause of the problem could be the convenience given to the app developer
to share frameworks, helpers or XPC Services in different apps. Particularly,
in our study, we scanned 1,612 apps from the Mac App Store and found 40
frameworks shared by different developers, e.g., DropboxOSX.framework used
by 14 apps for subscribing the Dropbox service. This security risk is not present
on iOS, on which the containers of main programs and sub-targets are put
under different parent directories, and most importantly, they are named with
randomly generated UUIDs. Again, the simplicity of the container structures
here could be the result of limited functionalities of iOS apps, which do not need
to extensively share resources among them.
Attack. This BID conflict threat affects every sandboxed app running on OS X.
In our study, we implemented end-to-end attacks on a few high-profile apps,
including Evernote, WeChat, QQ (a popular online chat app), Money Control (a
popular Finance app) and others (Section 4.2). For example, from the container
of Evernote, our attack app, involving an XPC Service that hijacked the target
app’s BID, successfully stole all the contacts of the user and her private notes
from ∼/Library/Containers/com.evernote.
Evernote/account/. Also, it recovered all the message photos under WeChat
and QQ. Again, our app got through the security check of the MAC App Store.
The video demos of the attacks can be found at [15]. In Section 4.2, we further
present the consequences of the attacks on other apps.
5Note that Gatekeeper typically blocks the installation of untrusted third-party
apps.
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3.3 IPC Interception
Breaches of cross-app resource sharing (i.e., keychain) and BID based sand-
box isolation mechanism unwittingly grant the adversary unauthorized access
to other apps’ resources. The problem, unfortunately, does not stop here: in
our research, we found that major cross-app communication (IPC) channels on
OS X, NSConnection in particular, and those deployed across platforms, such
as WebSocket and Scheme (Section 3.4), are also designed with flaws. This
exposes critical information, e.g. all Web passwords in major browsers, to the
adversary in even more various ways. Below we elaborate our findings.
NSConnection. As introduced before, NSConnection is an Apple-specific IPC
channel. It allows one party to act as the server and share an object with other
client apps. These clients can then communicate with the server by invoking the
interfaces defined within the object. The channel is designed to deliver a large
amount of data between apps, compared with Scheme (Section 3.4). A security
problem here is that the OS does not offer means for the apps to authenticate
each other when they are using NSConnection, nor does Apple ask the app
developer to avoid sending secrets across the channel. As a result, we found
that a sandboxed app can easily impersonate the server or the client of a target
app to the other party to access sensitive resources.
Specifically, to create an NSConnection object, the server needs to have a
name for the object, which is typically a constant string (e.g., com.evernote.ipc.client
for Evernote) hardcoded within the app. This name is later used by the client
to acquire the object from the OS (through the API rootProxyForConnecti
onWithRegisteredName). What can happen here is that an attack app can
create an NSConnection object with that name, ahead of the target server, to
impersonate it to the client. In this case, the client will be cheated into commu-
nicating with the attacker, taking it as the target. The attack can also go the
other way around: the malicious app, with the knowledge of the target server’s
name, can connect to it and use the interfaces of its object to invoke its internal
functions. Note that Apple does not offer any API to let the server or the client
find out the identity of the party it is talking to (e.g., the process ID of the
app). Therefore, authentication in the IPC is not supported by the OS. Given
that the need for such authentication has never been made clear by Apple, all
apps using this channel were found to be vulnerable in our research (Section 4).
WebSocket and beyond. Unlike NSConnection, WebSocket is not Apple-
specific, and instead a generic protocol for a server and a client to establish
a full-duplex single socket connection. Its specification [16], which has been
developed as part of the HTML5 standard, introduces a JavaScript interface
through which the web content inside a browser or an app’s webview instance
can directly talk to another app. This channel is often used by browser exten-
sions to communicate with an app on the local system through a predetermined
TCP port. Specifically, the app runs a WebSocket server to listen on the port,
which is connected by the script code of the extension to exchange data. The
problem is that in the absence of proper authentication, a malicious program
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(with the network permission when it is sandboxed) can preemptively claim the
port before the legitimate server does. This enables it to receive data from the
target extension. Such a security risk can also happen on the browser side: a
malicious extension can impersonate the authorized one to talk to the local app
through its port. Note that other inter-app communication through TCP port,
like the local web server used by popular app Pushbullet, can also be attacked
in this way.
It turns out that the Apple platforms do not provide any means for an exten-
sion to authenticate a local WebSocket server. There is no way for the extension
to find out the identity of the local app through an API call. The only solution
is a custom authentication mechanism built by the app/extension developer.
On the other hand, major browsers, e.g. Google Chrome, embed the ID of an
extension in their message delivered to the local program, which helps the latter
to determine whether the message comes from the right party. However, since
the extension impersonation threat has not been identified, the developer has
not been informed about the importance of building proper protection into her
app.
Attacks. The security risks of intercepting the IPC communication through
these vulnerable channels are realistic and serious. As an example, here we just
elaborate our end-to-end attacks on three popular apps. We analyzed the 1Pass-
word app for OS X, which is one of the most popular password management
apps and ranked 3rd by the MAC App Store [1]. The app comes with a browser
extension for each major browser that collects the passwords from the user’s web
account and passes them to the app through a WebSocket connection. In our
research, our sandboxed app created a local WebSocket server that took over
the port 6263, before the 1Password app did, and was successfully connected to
the password extension and downloaded the password whenever the user logged
into her web account. We reported our findings to the 1Password security team,
which acknowledged the gravity of this problem. This attack succeeded on OS X
10.10 (latest version when we reported the problem), against Chrome, Firefox
and Safari. Our attack code passed the vetting process of the MAC Store. The
attack demo is here [15].
The similar attack was also successful on Pushbullet, an Apple-recommended
popular app for exchanging notes, links, pictures and files between multiple
devices. The app authenticates a user by running Google Single Sign On (SSO)
within a browser. After the user signs in, Google redirects the browser to the
app’s local web server that listens on the port 20807, together with a secret
token. In our attack, this port was first taken over by the malicious app, which
then got the redirection link from Google and stole the token. After that, the
attacker released the port to Pushbullet, which later got the token resent by
Google.
We further exploited the NSConnection channel used by the famous Ever-
note app, the most popular notetaking and archiving app on the Apple platforms
(ranked 3rd among free “Productivity” apps in the MAC Store). Evernote in-
cludes an NSConnection server to exchange data with its helper program. What
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we found is that an attack app can impersonate Evernote’s server before it starts
to run and communicate with the helper. Also, it can act as the NSConnection
client to get an object from the server. The object our app obtained allowed the
attacker to acquire the authentication token of the Evernote app. Our demo is
posted here [15].
3.4 Scheme Hijacking
As mentioned earlier, URL Scheme, an inter-app communication channel, is
different on the Apple platforms. Specifically, Apple’s OSes automatically asso-
ciate a scheme with one app even with the presence of multiple apps claiming
the same scheme. This design leads to a unique problem to Apple’s OSes, as
elaborated below.
Scheme takeover. Essentially, a URL scheme is a simple protocol that an app
defines for communicating with others. The app specifies a URL format in its
plist file and lets other apps invoke it and pass parameters through the URL.
Once this URL is triggered within the browser or a webview instance inside
another app, an HTTP redirection is launched towards the “location” part of
the URL, e.g., “yelp:”, and thus activates the app claiming the scheme, using
the data delivered by the remaining part of the URL. Also, a scheme invocation
can be initiated by an app with the API openURL. Apple extensively utilizes
URL schemes to run system apps, e.g., mailto (for opening the Mail app), tel,
facetime and sms (for launching their corresponding apps).
Things become a bit tricky when two different apps register the same URL
scheme with the OS. This conflict is resolved on the Apple platforms according
to the nature of the scheme. Specifically, Apple has a list of system schemes (e.g.,
sms, Facetime, etc.) that cannot be taken by any third-party apps, and another
list of schemes whose affiliations can be changed under the user’s consent, e.g.,
the default browser for opening http. For a scheme not on the lists, it will
typically be bound to the first app that registers it on OS X and the last on iOS,
as discovered in our study. Given this conflict resolving strategy, a malicious
program can hijack a target app’s scheme to get the service request or even the
data sent to it. Particularly on iOS, the attack works even when the malware
is installed after the target app.
This scheme hijacking attack can be detected on OS X using the API
URLForApplicationToOpenURL or LSCopyDefault
HandlerForURLScheme, which returns the identity of the app that successfully
registers a given scheme. However, no corresponding API exists on the other
Apple’s OS, i.e., iOS. In the absence of such OS-level supports, an app can
do nothing to authenticate the party it invokes through a URL. Therefore, all
third-party apps running on iPhone and iPad are completely unprotected from
this threat. Note that Apple has never explicitly asked its developers to verify
the apps launched by URLs, nor does it check duplicated scheme definitions at
the App Stores, as observed in our study. The consequence is that oftentimes,
even OS X apps are less protected than they should, and vulnerable to the
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scheme hijacking attack (Section 4.2). Following we elaborated our end-to-end
attacks on some high-profile OS X and iOS apps. Note that our attack apps
were successfully uploaded to both the MAC and iOS App Stores.
Attack on OS X. In our research, we implemented an attack on Wunderlist, a
popular free app (ranked 5th in the “Productivity” category on the MAC Store)
for managing MAC users’ to-do lists. The app uses Google SSO: the user logs in
Google in the browser and then is redirected to the URL wunderlist://oauth/goo
gle?token=ya29XXX, which invokes Wunderlist, passing to it a secret token. In
our attack, an unauthorized app first registered the scheme “wunderlist://”.
As a result, our app stole the token from the browser. More interestingly, our
malicious app then immediately delivered the token to Wunderlist by calling
openURLs:withAppBundleID (an OS X specific API), acting as a man-in-the-
middle. This actually lets the SSO go through and therefore make the attack
stealthy. (The attack demo here [15].)
Attack on iOS. Scheme hijacking poses an especially serious threat to iOS,
which heavily relies on URLs for inter-app interactions (Section 4.2). As an ex-
ample, we exploited this weakness and successfully obtained the victim’s Face-
book token for Pinterest, the most famous personal media management app.
Specifically, Pinterest and other apps all support the SSO login through the
Facebook app. Whenever the user clicks on “continue with Facebook” in these
apps, the Facebook app is invoked to ask for the user’s permission to let the
authentication go through and also grant Pinterest (and other apps) access
to some of her Facebook data. With the user’s consent, Facebook triggers a
scheme fb274266067164://access_token=CAAAAP9uIENwBAKk&X=Y to deliver
a secret access token to the app. In our research, our attack app registered
“fb274266067164://” and took over this scheme. As a result, Facebook un-
wittingly launched our app and passed to it Pinterest’s access token. Actu-
ally even the scheme for invoking the Facebook app (“fbauth://”) was suc-
cessfully hijacked in another attack, which enabled the attacker to become a
man-in-the-middle, performing the whole SSO within its webview instance on
behalf of the real Facebook app. Most importantly, once it got the secret to-
ken from Facebook, the attacker forwarded it to the Pinterest app through
“fb274266067164://”, which completely hid the attack from the user. Note
that this last step can be detected using the API openURL:sourceApplication,
which returns to the caller (here, Pinterest) the party that initiates the scheme
communication. However, the protection is not in place within any apps that
we scanned (Section 4.2), including Pinterest. This may be due to the fact that
Apple never explicitly informs the developers to do this inspection. Interest-
ingly, again there’s no corresponding API for detection on the other Apple’s
OS, i.e., OS X this time. We successfully launched the attack. (The attack
demo here [15].)
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4 Measurement and Defense
In this section, we elaborate an automatic analysis tool we built for detecting
vulnerable apps and a measurement study that reveals the scope and magnitude
of the XARA problem. We further show that though a generic solution to the
problem needs a significant effort from Apple and its app developers, a simple
native program operating on MAC OS X can help mitigate the threats.
4.1 Detection of Vulnerable Apps
Among all the security weaknesses reported in Section 3, some (e.g., the scheme
hijacking on iOS, the BID conflict, NSConnection) are caused entirely by the
security flaws within the system (OS or the Apple Store), and only a system-
level solution can fix them. Other threats, however, are more contingent upon
what an app does, particularly, whether it properly authenticates the party it
interacts with. To better understand the impacts of those security weaknesses,
we developed Xavus, an XARA vulnerability scanner that statically inspects
Apple apps’ binaries to identify those susceptible to the XARA threat. This
analyzer was then used to evaluate the security qualities of a set of popular
apps (Section 4.2). Note that Xavus can also serve the developer by helping her
identify XARA weaknesses in her app, which is important given the challenges
in fixing the problems on the system level: e.g., the keychain issue we reported
last October is still not successfully fixed in the most recent OS X 10.10.3 and
beta version 10.10.4.
Design. The idea for detecting the XARA vulnerability within an app is to
find out whether the app authenticates other parties associated with a service
(e.g., keychain) or a channel (e.g., WebSocket, NSConnection or Scheme) before
using it. Since typically, one needs to first claim such a service or channel, what
we need to do is to inspect the control-flow graph (CFG) between the program
location for the claim and that for the use and find out whether the authentica-
tion has happened. To this end, Xavus is designed to include five modules, as
illustrated in Figure 3, for disassembling an app’s binary, determining whether a
specific service or channel is utilized, and if so constructing CFG and define-use
chains, and identifying the presence of authentication on the define-use chains.
Following we describe how this design works and how it was implemented in our
research.
Apple code analysis. The first step for analyzing an MAC or iOS app is to
disassemble its binary. Most Apple’s apps are built with Objective-C and their
binaries are in the Mach-O format. Disassembling such binaries is done within
our implementation of Xavus through Hopper [8], a popular tool for reverse-
engineering Mach-O files [12], which converts the MAC binaries into Intel x64
instructions and iOS app code into ARMv7 instructions under our settings.
Note that iOS apps are encrypted and need to be decrypted before they can be
analyzed by Xavus. In our research, we ran Clutch [2] to decrypt iOS apps and
then collect their binaries.
To determine the type of services or channels an app uses, our analyzer
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Figure 3: Detection of XARA Vulnerability
inspects its instructions for related API calls, e.g., SecKeyc
hainFindGenericPassword for keychain access. The names of these functions
are all kept under a specific section of the app’s Mach-O file. Such a function is
invoked by the Objective-C binary in a unique way: it is triggered by sending
messages to the function’s object, which happens through passing a pointer to
the message receiver, the name of the function (called selector, a null-terminated
string), together with other parameters to the runtime function objc msgSend.
This operation can be observed from an app’s recovered instruction set when
the selector (i.e., function name) is stored to the RSI register for preparing the
objc msgSend call. Leveraging this observation, Xavus can find out the program
location where a service or channel is claimed and where it is used.
To detect vulnerable apps that claim and use services or channels without
authentication, we need to not only search for the presence of authentication
API, but also check whether the authentication actually happens to the services
or channels in use. To this end, our approach first searches for the invocation of
the API for claiming a service or channel, and runs Hopper scripts to construct
a CFG for the procedure involving that API call (Figure 3). Then, from the
location of the claim, Xavus performs a define-use analysis: from the reference
of the service/channel (e.g., a pointer to a keychain item, or the constant string
for a scheme), as returned by the API for the resource claim, our approach
identifies all the program locations where the reference is utilized before it has
been redefined (e.g., the variable holding the reference is assigned with a different
value). The objective here is to locate another API for using the service or
channel (e.g., updating a password to a keychain), so as to find out whether
proper authentication happens before the use. Typically, the claim (getting
the reference) for a service/channel and the use of the service/channel (through
the reference) stay in the same procedure. Occasionally, these API calls are
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placed in different functions, and need to be linked by constructing an inter-
procedure CFG. This can be done using the techniques described in the prior
research [19]. Along the execution path identified during the construction of
the define-use chain, our analysis module further checks whether the reference
of the service/channel is passed to any authentication operation, according to
the types of the services and channels in use.
#BasicBlock1: 
 ... 
 1.  lea       rcx, qword [ss:rbp - 0x30] 
 2.  mov     qword [ss:rsp+0x8], rcx 
 3.  call      SecKeychainFindGenericPassword
 4.  mov     r8d, eax  
 5.  cmp     r8d, 0xffff9d2c 
 6.  jne       BasicBlock2 
… 
#BasicBlock2: 
 7.  test      r8d, r8d 
 8.  jne       BasicBlock3 
#BasicBlock3: 
 9.   mov   r15, qword [ss:rbp - 0x30]
  ... 
 10. mov   rdi, r15
 11. call    SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesAndData
3. 
SecKeychainFindGenericPassword 
( …, &[ss:rbp - 0x30], …)
10. mov rdi, r15 
9. mov r15, qword [ss:rbp - 0x30]
11. 
SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesA
ndData( rdi, …)
get reference [ss:rbp - 0x30] of 
keychain item through 
SecKeychainFindGenericPassword()
CFG Assembly Code Define-Use Chain
use reference rdi of keychain item for 
updating password through  
SecKeychainItemModifyAttributesAnd
Data()
reference  propagation
reference  propagation
…
Figure 4: Detection of Evernote’s Vulnerable Code for Keychain Password Up-
dating
Figure 4 shows an example for the analysis on Mac Evernote app (Version
6.0.9), which does not authenticate the owner of a keychain item before updat-
ing to it the user’s password. Specifically, Xavus first builds the CFG of an
Evernote procedure [ENKeychai
nHelper saveValue:toKeyChainItem], and locates the claim for the keychain
service, i.e., getting a reference of an item through the API SecKeychainFindGenericPassword
(Line 3 under Assembly Code in Figure 4). The reference is returned in mem-
ory [ss:rbp - 0x30]. Then Xavus follows the propagation of the reference and
identifies one instance of using it, i.e., updating passwords through the OS X
API SecKeychainIt
emModifyAttributesAndData. Xavus reports that Evernote is vulnerable due
to the absence of authentication before the use of the reference.
Flaw detection. As mentioned earlier, Xavus is designed to detect missing
authentication of the parties that share a service or a channel with an app before
it is utilized by the app, a necessary condition for the presence of the XARA
weakness. To this end, we built into our analyzer a set of features to fingerprint
the authentication operation for each channel or service, as elaborated below.
• Keychain. The claim of this service happens when the app calls SecKeychainFindGenericPassword
or SecKeychainF
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indInternetPassword. Both APIs return itemRef, the reference to the item.
This reference will ultimately be used to update a password to the keychain
item through either SecKeychainIt
emModifyAttributesAndData or SecKeychainItemMo
difyContent. The only possible way that app could find out whether the item
is created by a trusted party is to inspect its ACL that documents all the apps
allowed to access the item. This is done through the API SecACLCopyContents.
The absence of a call to the API on the execution path (between the claim and
the use locations) indicates the existence of a XARA risk within the app.
• NSConnection. As discussed in Section 3.3, NSConnection involves a server
and a client. On the client side, the app’s claim for the channel (connecting to
the server) is identified from the API rootProxyForConnectionWithRegisteredName
or co
nnectionWithRegisteredName, which returns an object fr-
om the server. Whenever any parameter on the object is found to be passed
to a function call, we consider that the channel is used. Between these ends,
authentication needs to be done for the client to verify the identity of the server
sharing the NSConnection object. This, however, is not supported on today’s
MAC OS X. More specifically, the name of the object is mapped within the OS
to an NSMachPort object directly related to the server app. The problem is that
according to Apple, verification of an app through its NSMachPort has yet been
implemented [4]. Note that once this support is provided, we can look for the
API SecCodeCheckVal
idity to determine whether the authentication is in place. On the server side,
whenever the app calls serviceConnectionWith
Name to share its object, it loses the control on the object. Any party can get it
from the OS.
• WebSocket. WebSocket servers are typically built over a few popular open-
source frameworks, such as CocoaHTTPServer [3] and QtWebKit [14]. All of
them provide a receiver method for getting messages from browser extensions,
which is used by Xavus to fingerprint this channel, and a response method for
replying to the extensions. The invocations of these two methods are identified
as the claim and the use of the channel, respectively. Between them, the server
is supposed to access the HTTP header Origin that includes extension IDs
attached by the browser and check the signature of the browser through the
API SecCodeCheckValidity. If these operations are not found, the app is
considered vulnerable to the threat from a malicious extension or app. On the
other hand, the attack from a malicious server against an extension cannot be
detected through any existing APIs.
• Scheme. The most popular ways for one app to launch another through the
Scheme channel is to trigger a constant link embedded in the app or a URL
returned from its webview instance. The former can be directly found from the
app, while the latter comes from one of the four methods of WebPolicyDelegate,
an object that lets an app control the operations on the web content within the
webview. On the list are decidePolicyForMIMEType:reques
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t:, decidePolicyForNavigationAction:request:, d
ecidePolicyForNewWindowAction:request: and wil
lPerformClientRedirectToURL:. The program location where any of these
methods is invoked or the constant string is accessed is considered to be a claim
for the Scheme channel. The use of the channel happens when the URL is
invoked through openURL.
On OS X, between the claim and the use, the app can run URLFor
ApplicationToOpenURL or LSCopyDefaultHandlerFor
URLScheme to find out which app will be launched by a given scheme. In the
absence of any of these calls, it is highly likely that the app is vulnerable to
the scheme hijacking attack. An exception is when the scheme here is actually
claimed by the OS, for example, mail, facetime, etc., which can be easily
identified when the URL is a constant string within an app. In the case that
it actually comes from the web, the chance is that it is indeed vulnerable, as
the webview can be used to open any links. Note that for iOS, an app does not
have any means to find out the owner of a scheme.
• BID. The BID confusion problem is completely caused by the Apple Store
and the design of the MAC OS X sandbox. Nevertheless, Xavus is built to
find out whether apps deposit data to their containers, which indicates that
sensitive information could be exposed through this vulnerability. This data-
storing activity can be easily identified from the function call NSHomeDirectory.
Discussion. Our current implementation of Xavus works effectively on most
apps over the Apple platforms, as observed in our research (Section 4.2). Even
though Xavus was implemented for detecting the XARA on known channels,
the idea behind it, authentication check between the claim and the use of a
channel, could find its application to detecting similar flaws within other cross-
app mechanisms. However, there are situations when a vulnerable app falls
through the crack: for example, when the app dynamically generates the scheme
to be invoked. On the other hand, the app developer might implement some
ad-hoc protection that our analyzer misses. This happens to those using the
keychain or WebSocket. An app could delete its keychain item and create a
new one each time when it updates new credentials there, an approach that
Apple does not recommend [11]. Also, a browser extension may authenticate
a local program using a secret over the WebSocket channel. In our research, we
manually analyzed the apps randomly sampled from those flagged as vulnerable
by our implementation to ensure that the results were accurate, and concluded
that they indeed were in a vast majority of cases.
4.2 Impacts
With the help of Xavus, we were able to analyze a large number of popular Ap-
ple apps to understand their susceptibility to the XARA threat. In our study,
we downloaded 1,612 free apps from the MAC App Store. These apps cover all
21 categories of the store, including social networking, finance, business, and
others. In each category, we picked up all the free apps when less than 100
of them are there, and top 100 otherwise. Also from the iOS App Store, we
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collected 200 most popular apps, 40 each from “All Categories”, “Finance”,
“Business”, “Social Networking” and “Productivity”, after removing duplica-
tions. The decrypted versions of these apps were extracted using Clutch [2].
All the apps were first quickly scanned to determine whether they utilize vul-
nerable services or channels, or export to their container directories. This was
done by running the utility otool to extract Mach-O sections “ objc selrefs”
and “ objc msgrefs” from each app’s binary and look for the functions finger-
printing different services, channels and operations, as described in Section 4.1.
The apps discovered at this stage were further analyzed using Xavus for missing
authentication operations. A problem is that Hopper does not support a batch
mode. To analyze an app, we had to manually load it into Hopper before it
could be automatically evaluated by Xavus. This process was time-consuming,
taking from about 1 to 30 minutes per app. The developer of Hopper informed
us that the batch mode will be supported in the near future. For the time being,
however, we could only analyze 200 randomly-chosen apps in the case that more
were found to be associated with a channel or a service.
Vulnerable apps. Table 1 summarizes our findings. Specifically, among all
1,612 MAC apps, 198 of them use the keychain. Xavus did not find that any
security check is performed by these apps between their claim of the keychain
item and use of it to store sensitive data. We further randomly chose 20 samples
from the 198 apps and inspected them manually. It turns out that all of them
can be easily attacked except todo Cloud and Contacts Sync For Google Gmail,
which delete their current keychain items and create new ones before updat-
ing their data. Note that this practice (deleting an existing item) is actually
discouraged by Apple, which suggests to modify the item instead [11].
Channel
apps with the
channel /total
vulnerable/
scanned
exploitable/
sampled
Keychain 198/1,612 198/198 18/20
NSConnection 58/1,612 58/58 20/20
Scheme (iOS) 138/200 106/138 20/20
Scheme(OS X) 982/1,612 132/200 20/20
BID 468/1,612 468/468 20/20
Table 1: Vulnerable Apps
For the IPC on OS X, we found that 58 apps use NSConnection. All these
apps were vulnerable. Again we sampled 20 and confirmed that all of them were
indeed exploitable.
We did not find in our collection any free app using WebSocket. However,
there are popular paid apps claiming this channel. Particularly, 1Password is
a leading paid app, which, as described in Section 3.3, is completely vulnera-
ble. Other examples include LastPass (a popular password management app),
Adobe Creative Cloud (an Adobe service app) and LiveReload (for dynamic
web content reloading). These apps were all vulnerable to the attacks from
malicious apps (Section 3.3).
When it comes to Scheme, we discovered 982 MAC apps using this channel.
From them, 200 apps were randomly picked and analyzed by Xavus, which
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XARA types Secrets exposed Apps/Services affected
Password Stealing
(keychain)
passwords/
authentication tokens
iCloud, Gmail, Google Drive, Facebook, Twitter,
any web account used in Chrome.
IPC Interception
authentication tokens/
OS X username and password
Keychain Access, 1Password, Evernote, Pushbullet.
Scheme Hijacking
passwords/
authentication tokens
Dropbox, Pinterest, Evernote, 1Password,
Dashlane, Kindle, Instagram, Whatsapp.
Container Cracking
email/cookies
Foxmail, App for Gmail, Mailtab for Gmail,
Mailtab for Outlook.
notes/contacts/instant message pictures Evernote, QQ, WeChat.
cookies Money Control, Inspire Finance Lite, Tumblr, AnyDo, Pocket.
Table 2: Examples of XARA Consequences
reported that 132 were vulnerable. We further manually looked into 20 samples
and successfully built end-to-end attacks. The remaining 68 apps either use
Apple reserved schemes or dynamically create their URLs from network traffic
or other sources, which our current implementation cannot handle. Among the
200 iOS apps, 138 were detected to trigger URL schemes. 106 of them were
reported to be vulnerable. Through random sampling, we confirmed that this
finding is accurate. Also, those that could not be confirmed are very much
in line with their MAC counterparts, either running reserved schemes or too
complicated to analyze. Finally, 468 out of the 1,612 MAC apps were detected
to write to their container directories, which can all be read by unauthorized
apps hijacking their BIDs. Overall, at least 88.6% of the scanned apps using
these cross-app channels are vulnerable to XARA attacks.
Consequences. Attacks on these vulnerable apps will have serious conse-
quences. Table 2 lists some examples of the findings made in our research.
Specifically, keychain credentials for high-profile services (e.g. iCloud, Gmail,
Google Drive, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) and any web accounts in
Google Chrome are completely exposed. All their passwords and secret tokens
can be collected by the adversary. Those vulnerable to the IPC interception
include Keychain Access, Evernote, 1Password, Pushbullet, etc. Their sensitive
data, such as authentication tokens and even current OS user’s username and
passwords are up for grabs. The scheme vulnerability was found in 1Password,
Dashlane, Evernote, Kindle, Adobe Revel, Wunderlist, etc., on OS X, through
which app users’ credentials can be gathered. On iOS, popular apps like Pinter-
est, Instagram, U.S. Bank (banking), Citi Mobile (banking), PayPal, Amazon,
WhatsApp, Dropbox, etc., were found to be exploitable. Their authentication
tokens and other information can be stolen.
The BID confusion problem also has a significant impact. For example,
our study shows that popular mail clients, such as App for Gmail, Mailtab for
Gmail and Outlook, all expose MAC users’ emails and their cookies to the app
hijacking their BID. Other apps that expose cookies include popular Finance
apps Money Control and Inspire Finance Lite, as well as Tumblr, AnyDo, Pocket
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and more. Note that all the attack apps were successfully released by the Apple
Stores. So, the security threats are indeed realistic.
4.3 Mitigation
Addressing the XARA problems is more difficult than it appears to be. Often-
times, the OS itself does not know how to protect the resource of a third-party
app. Proper interfaces may need to be given to the app developers to let them
specify and enforce their individual policies. A prominent example is the key-
chain, for which the OS is in no position to decide whether a set of attributes
for retrieving an item should be used by one app but not others. Due to such
complexity, these security weaknesses will likely be there for a while, before Ap-
ple figures out a way to work with the developers to fix them together. Indeed,
since we reported the keychain issue to Apple in last October, so far, Apple did
nothing except using a random username to patch some of its own apps, which
turns out to be futile (Section 3.1).
Given the challenges in finding a long-term solution, it is important to have
some protection in place to mitigate the threat. In this section, we describe a
simple, lightweight scanner app, which automatically detects XARA attempts
on OS X. As a third-party program running in the user land, this scanner can
be easily deployed to provide the Apple user immediate protection.
Idea and implementation. The idea of our XARA scanner is to inspect public
information whenever a change to the system happens (e.g., write to a file, in-
stallation of a new app) to detect whether a service, resource or channel claimed
by one app has been hijacked by another. This design enables the scanner to
work efficiently and as we will show later, also effectively. Specifically, our app
registers file system event with API FSEvents, which is issued when a specific file
has been modified. Specifically, the scanner monitors the keychain files under
/Library/Keychains/ and ∼/Library/Keychains/. Whenever they’re modi-
fied, our app uses the API SecItemCopyMatching to find out whether a new item
has been added, and if so further retrieves its ACL using SecACLCopyContents
and inspects all the apps on the list. Typically, a system app does not share the
list with a third-party app. Once this is detected, the scanner notifies the user
of the potential risk. When it comes to a third-party app, all we can do is to
build profiles for popular MAC apps through an offline analysis. Each profile
contains the ACL an app is supposed to use, which is compared with the one
retrieved from the keychain to detect an exploit attempt.
For Scheme and BID, our scanner keeps track of newly installed programs
through the event API FSEvents. Whenever an app is installed, the scanner goes
through its plist to find out whether the URL scheme it registers or the BIDs of
its helper programs or XPC Services are in conflict with the ones already in the
system. Such a conflict indicates an exploit attempt, either from the new app
or existing ones, and therefore triggers an alarm. Note that on scheme conflicts,
even Apple does not know which app is legitimate to bond to a scheme. What
Apple’s OSes do is to arbitrarily associate the scheme with an app claiming that
scheme (Section 3.4) while XARA scanner reports which app is associated with
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a scheme and the apps that fail to do so.
For NSConnection, in the absence of the app developer’s help, an exploit
cannot be detected before it happens. This is because whenever a third-party
app claims an object name or requests an existing one, there is no reason to
believe that the operation is illegitimate without the policies from the developer
indicating that such resources should only be assigned to a specific app. On the
other hand, once the attack happens, it can be quickly detected. Our scanner
redirects outputs of command syslog -w to get new system logs immediately
after they are generated. Once it observes a failed attempt to register an existing
object name or connect to an NSConnnection server that serves another app, an
alarm is triggered, as such a conflict is not supposed to happen. This approach
does not work on WebSocket, as the contest on a network port will not show
up on the log. The problem can be addressed using a heavyweight system-level
solution, for example, running DTrace [7] to monitor the app’s system calls.
Evaluation. We evaluated our implementation (a native app) against afore-
mentioned XARA attacks (Section 3) except that on WebSocket. Our scanner
detected all the exploits on the keychain, URL schemes (on OS X) and BIDs,
before the malicious attempts could be executed. For the NSConnection inter-
ceptions, it caught them from the events in the system log after the attacks
happened. Note that since such contention of app-specific resources, channels
or services does not exist during the system’s normal operations, our scanner
will not cause a false alarm, though it might miss some exploit attempts. We
further measured its performance on a MacBook Pro (Mid 2014 model, 2.6 GHz
Intel i5, 8 GB memory, SSD), under OS X 10.10.2. It utilizes no more than 0.2%
of CPU during operations. .
5 Lessons Learnt
Almost all the XARA weaknesses we discovered in this research come from
Apple’s unique design of cross-app resource sharing and communication mech-
anisms, e.g., keychain for sharing passwords, BID based separation, NSCon-
nection for distributing objects and URL scheme for app invocation (different
from Android). Other XARA problems, i.e., the WebSocket issues may also
exist on other OSes, such as Windows and Android. This demonstrates that
the XARA weakness is indeed pervasive and serious. A natural question here
is how those problems have been introduced and what we can learn from them.
In the section, we try to answer the question, presenting the insights gained
from analyzing those vulnerabilities and the principles for designing a securer
system.
Insights. The fundamental cause for the XARA flaws is unprotected cross-app
resource sharing and communication. Comparing OS X with iOS, the latter is
relatively securer simply because it does not support credential sharing (among
different apps) through a keychain item and sub-target sharing (e.g., framework)
through containers, nor does it provide any complicated IPC mechanism like
NSConnection. For every avenue opened across apps, proper authentication
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should always be in place. Otherwise, an XARA risk may show up.
Apparently, XARA is an instance of the classic Unverified Ownership or
Resource Squatting problem [5, 6, 23], in which software fails to verify which
party owns a piece of critical resource. The unique challenge in addressing
the issue, however, is that when it comes to the interactions across third-party
apps, less clear are who should perform the verification and how to do so. For
example, when an app deposits the user’s credential to another party’s keychain
item on OS X, as long as it is indeed on the item’s ACL, the operating system is
not at a position to judge the legitimacy of the operation, since this is allowed
for credential sharing. As another example, neither OS X nor iOS has any idea
which app is entitled to a specific URL scheme. The authentication here (on the
owner of the keychain item or the scheme before delivering data to it) can only
be performed by the app. Yet, the OS provider still has the responsibility to
assist the app developer in implementing such protection (e.g. providing proper
APIs) and further verify its presence in her app, which is essential for fostering
a secure ecosystem.
Following we summarize the above insights into three key principles for
avoiding XARA hazards in cross-app interactions.
Design Principle 1: Determine what the OS can protect and what it cannot
for every cross-app channel. When a new way for cross-app resource sharing or
communication is provided, the OS designer always needs to determine whether
authenticating the parties involved can be done at the OS level or only by
individual apps. The OS needs to address the security issues whenever possible
to ensure the effectiveness of the protection and makes it clear what should be
taken care of by the app developer. Among all the XARA cases we discovered,
container sharing should be fully secured by the OS: it has sufficient information
to decide what is allowed to share (e.g., framework) and what is not (e.g., the
helper program’s directory). On the other hand, the keychain item, parties in
an IPC and the scheme owner often can only be checked by the app. It is
important to identify how to divide the responsibilities of security protection at
the early stage of developing cross-app channels.
Design Principle 2: Inform the app developer required app-side security checks
and provide means to do so. Whenever a cross-app channel is found to need the
app developer’s involvement to secure, the OS provider should explicitly inform
the developer what she is supposed to do and provide proper technical sup-
ports. Our study shows that this is exactly what Apple falls short. Oftentimes,
it does not offer any APIs for the required authentication: examples include
NSConnection, Keychain and WebSocket, etc. Even when the API is available,
e.g., for finding the app to be launched through a scheme, rarely have we found
any instructions for the developer to do that. In the absence of such supports,
XARA flaws become inevitable.
Design Principle 3: Detect missing security checks at the app store. Even with
the proper information and technical means, we believe that the OS provider
can do more to help the app developer and secure its app ecosystem. What
can be leveraged here is how the apps are disseminated today: they are mainly
25
downloaded and installed from a centralized app store under the control of the
provider, which enables the provider to make vulnerability detection part of its
app vetting process. This is complete feasible, given the fact that today the
Apple Store takes more than a week to approve an app while the automatic
tools like Xavus can be built to detect missing authentication within the app in
minutes.
6 Related Work
XARA attacks on Android. Security flaws related to XARA have been
discovered on Android, e.g., different types of confused deputy problems within
Android apps [20, 17, 21, 24]. Most relevant to our work is the prior research
on mobile origin crossing [25], which reports an attack that a malicious Android
app registers the scheme of a URL not meant for invoking apps and runs it in a
browser to get a Facebook token. This problem is not a scheme hijacking, since
the scheme here is not associated with any legitimate app. Actually, preempting
another app’s scheme is hard on Android because whenever there are two apps
registering the same scheme, Android always notifies the user and let her make
the decision. Also such a problem has already been fixed by Facebook, yet the
scheme hijacking is an issue they are not aware of. Also related is the study on
the Pileup [28] attacks, in which a malicious app can gain an elevated privilege
through a system upgrade. The problem here is not in the design of isolation
protection but the mechanism to grant an app additional permissions, which
has been circumvented in the upgrade process.
Security on the Apple platforms. Compared with Android, the Apple plat-
forms are much less studied in terms of their security protection. A technical
blog [9] talked about insecure handling of schemes in the invoked apps on iOS,
which is not the scheme hijacking on both OS X and iOS, as discussed in this
paper. Prior academic research almost solely focuses on various techniques to
bypass the security checks on iOS private APIs [27, 22] and use of them to propa-
gate malware infections [26]. Understanding the security implications of Apple’s
inter-app interactions and sandbox design has never been done before. Simulta-
neously and independently, Fireye found the risk of hijacking iOS schemes and
put a blog online [10]. However, they just briefly discuss this security risk with-
out giving much detail, with a demo that apparently shows a simple phishing
attack. By comparison, our work is much more thorough, deeper and broader.
We built end-to-end attacks on several high-impact apps (e.g., Facebook, Pin-
terest, etc.), identified the impacts of the threat over a thousand apps, and more
importantly demonstrate that the attacks can be made stealthy (through dif-
ferent man-in-the-middle tricks on MAC OS and iOS, passing the stolen token
to the victim app, to completely conceal the attack), which is nontrivial (see
Section 3.4). Also we completely circumvented the restrictive security checks of
the Apple Stores: actually, our attack apps were approved by the App Store on
January 23, 2015, almost one month earlier than the blog (February 19), which
did not mention any study on the protection provided by the App Store. Fur-
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ther, we discovered that the problem exists on both iOS and OS X and different
strategies these OSes took to resolve conflicts in Scheme claims (Section 3.4),
which is important to the success of the attack. Finally, we developed techniques
for automatically detecting such exploits and mitigating this risk.
Related to Xavus is PiOS [19], a general-purpose code analysis tool for iOS
apps, which has not been made publicly available so far. By comparison, our
approach was designed specifically for detecting XARA flaws within both MAC
OS and iOS apps.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we identify a new category of security weaknesses, called XARA,
that pose a serious threat to the app isolation protection on modern OSes. Our
study on the threat over the Apple platforms, the first of this kind, reveals
its pervasiveness and significant impacts: critical system services and channels,
including the keychain, WebSocket, NSConnection and Scheme, can all be ex-
ploited to gain access to other apps’ resources, and even the Apple Sandbox on
OS X can be cracked, exposing an app’s container directory to the unautho-
rized party. The consequences of these attacks are serious, including leaks of
user passwords, secret tokens and all kinds of sensitive documents. Our research
shows that fundamentally the problem comes from lack of authentication during
app-to-app and app-to-system interactions, and further proposes new techniques
to detect and mitigate such a threat. This preliminary effort contributes to a
better understanding of this understudied security problem, an important step
for building a more effective app isolation mechanism on future OSes.
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